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HASTINGS WOMEN’S LAW JOURNAL 227 
                                “Being Gay in Lubbock:”                        
The Equal Access Act in Caudillo 
Sarah Orman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Equal Access Act (“EAA”) prohibits any secondary school that re-
ceives federal funding and opens its doors to extracurricular clubs from 
discriminating among clubs on the basis of viewpoint.1  Passed in 1984, the 
EAA was intended by its supporters to end discrimination against religious 
speech by school authorities and to protect the rights of high school stu-
dents to hold religious-oriented meetings on campus.2  In a twist unin-
tended by its authors, the EAA also became a valuable legal tool for groups 
devoted to the rights of LGBT teens, such as the Gay/Straight Alliance 
(“GSA”).  Recent district court decisions in Utah, Kentucky, and California 
have consistently upheld the right of gay student organizations to hold 
meetings on campus under the EAA.3 
In March 2004, however, a federal district court in western Texas up-
held the decision of authorities at Lubbock High School (“LHS”) to prevent 
the GSA from displaying fliers on campus or advertising its meetings on 
                                                          *  J.D. Candidate, May 2006, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; 
M.A., Slavic Languages and Literatures, University of Wisconsin, May 2001; B.A., Russian 
Studies, The Evergreen State College, May 1998. I would like to thank the members of the 
Hastings Women’s Law Journal for their assistance in editing this Note. Thanks also to my 
father, Jim Walsh. 
1.  20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000). 
2.  130 CONG. REC. 23, 32316 (1984) (“The congressional intent in passing The Equal 
Access Act was to develop legislation that respects both the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, so that secondary school 
students may organize meetings.  While Congress recognized the constitutional prohibition 
against state-sponsored religious activities in public schools, it also believed that student-
initiated speech, including religious speech, should not be excised from the school environ-
ment.”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990) (interpreting legislative 
intent behind the EAA “to address perceived widespread discrimination against religious 
speech in public schools”). 
3.  Boyd County High Sch. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 
(E.D. Ky. 2003); Gay/Straight Alliance Network v. Visalia Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d 1088 
(E.D. Cal. 2001); E. High Sch. Prism Club v. Seidel, et al., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (D. Utah 
2000). 
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the school PA system, because the school district had lawfully prohibited 
their use of campus facilities under two subsections of the statute preserv-
ing the school district’s authority to maintain discipline and protect the 
well-being of students and faculty.4  Caudillo v. Lubbock Independent 
School District marks the first time a court has entered judgment for a 
school district in opposition to a GSA after closely interpreting these sub-
sections of the EAA.5 
This Note will analyze Caudillo in light of the EAA’s history and pur-
pose.  In Part II, I will focus on the EAA itself, including its legislative and 
case history.  Part III contains a detailed description of the facts and legal 
issues in Caudillo.  This Note concludes with an analysis of the opinion in 
which I argue that the court erred by: (1) interpreting the school district’s 
denial of official recognition as the “least restrictive method” under the 
First Amendment of protecting students from sexually explicit material; 
and (2) refusing to apply the standard for “material and substantial disrup-
tion” from Tinker to all provisions of the EAA, thus permitting a school 
district to deny access based on speculative misconduct in violation of the 
EAA and the First Amendment.  I will then argue that the court’s interpre-
tation of the EAA violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause to 
the extent that it rested on the implicit assumption, contrary to stated legis-
lative intent, that religious speech is granted preference under the EAA. 
II. THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT 
“It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives 
Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny 
equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students 
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis 
of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at 
such meetings.”6 
A. HISTORY OF THE EAA 
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court held in Widmar v. Vincent 
that the University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university which had 
created a limited open forum by opening its doors to extracurricular student 
groups, could not discriminate against student groups wishing to hold 
prayer meetings or religious discussions.7  The Court, however, declined to 
extend the same standard to secondary schools, reasoning that “university 
                                                          
4.  Caudillo, et al. v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist. et al., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 572 (N.D. 
Tex. 2004). 
5.  The court in Caudillo noted that, although some of the cases cited by plaintiffs 
“raised the exception to the EAA for maintaining order and discipline, the cases lacked any 
meaningful discussion of the ‘well-being exception’ to the EAA.”  311 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 
n.5. 
6.  20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). 
7.  454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
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students are, of course, young adults.  They are less impressionable than 
younger students and should be able to appreciate that the University’s pol-
icy is one of neutrality toward religion.”8  Two circuit court decisions sub-
sequently refused to extend Widmar in a high school context.9  (Ironically, 
one of these cases was a Fifth Circuit opinion regarding LHS.)  In response 
to these opinions, and with the backing of a Senate Report providing evi-
dence of widespread “discrimination by school authorities against religious 
speech by students,”10 Congress enacted the EAA in order to overturn the 
circuit courts and guarantee the rights of religious high school groups to 
meet on campus.11 
Although its writers originally envisioned the EAA as specifically pro-
tecting religious activity, its protection was extended to clubs espousing po-
litical and philosophical as well as religious views.12  Both proponents and 
critics of the bill were aware of the new legislation’s applicability in con-
texts beyond religion.  When asked during floor debates whether an organi-
zation supporting gay rights would be protected, Senator Mark Hatfield (R, 
Oregon), a supporter of the EAA, did not deny its applicability and stated, 
“I am willing to take my risk on the expansion of freedom and rights rather 
than trying to nail them down so specifically.”13  Senator Howard Met-
zenbaum (D, Ohio), an opponent of the bill, stated, “I read this language [of 
the EAA] to say that . . . if some group advocating gay rights wanted to use 
the school, it would appear very clear that there would be no right to deny 
                                                          
8.  Id. at 274 n.14; see also Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 552 
(3d Cir. 1984) (reasoning that high school students are less mature and more impressionable 
than university students, and thus “the possible perception by adolescent students that gov-
ernment is communicating a message of endorsement of religion if it permitted a religious 
group to meet would be vastly different in a high school setting than the perception of such 
action by college students in a college setting”), vacated, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (vacating on 
jurisdictional grounds without deciding the merits of the case). 
9.  Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (holding that secondary school is not a “public forum” under Widmar even if al-
lowing many student groups to meet after school), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155-1156 (1983); 
Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of Guilderland Cent. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that secondary school is not a public forum where religious views can be freely aired), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981). 
10.  130 CONG. REC. 14, 19212 (1984) (Statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch (R, Utah)). 
11.  See H.R. REP. No. 98-710, at 3-6 (1984) (discussing Lubbock Civil Liberties Union 
and Brandon); S. REP. NO. 98-357, at 6-9, 11-14 (1984) (discussing same). 
12.  See Regina Grattan, Note, It’s Not Just for Religion Anymore: Expanding the Pro-
tections of the Equal Access Act to Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual High School Students, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 586 (1999) (“When members of Congress first introduced the 
Equal Access Act, the legislation specifically addressed the right of religious clubs to meet.  
When Congress finally enacted the law, however, Congress did not limit the Equal Access 
Act’s application to religious clubs.”); see also 130 CONG. REC. 19, 19221 (1984) (“Reli-
gious speech will not be singled out for separate treatment . . . Under the [Equal Access 
Act], a limited open forum is available to young people to meet and discuss religious, politi-
cal, philosophical, and other ideas.”) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D, Vermont)). 
13.  130 CONG. REC. at 19, 19223-27. 
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them those facilities.”14 
Not long after the EAA was enacted, the bill’s original sponsors pre-
sented a series of guidelines to Congress (“the Guidelines”), which were 
intended to aid school administrators in understanding the import of the 
new legislation.15  In drafting the Guidelines, a coalition of experts from 
leading groups in education, religion, and civil liberties came together to 
offer advice in how to implement equal access and answer specific ques-
tions that were likely to arise about the law’s effect.16  Although legislators 
cautioned that the Guidelines were not law, they emphasized their signifi-
cance, especially since the EAA in its final form had been enacted without 
the benefit of an accompanying congressional report.17  The Guidelines are 
particularly informative with regard to the EAA’s application to politically 
controversial groups: 
 
Q.  What about groups which wish to advocate or discuss 
changes in existing law? 
A.  Students who wish to discuss controversial social and legal 
issues such as the rights of the unborn, drinking age, the draft and 
alternative lifestyles may not be barred on the basis of the content 
of their speech.  However, the school must not sanction meetings in 
which unlawful conduct occurs.18 
B. LANGUAGE OF THE EAA 
The operative phrase in the EAA is “limited open forum,” which the 
statute defines as occurring whenever a public secondary school “grants an 
offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student 
groups to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.”19  The 
phrase “noncurriculum related” has been judicially interpreted to mean 
“any student group that does not directly relate to the body of courses of-
fered by the school.”20  “Noninstructional time” includes any time set aside 
by the school for noncurricular activities before or after “actual classroom 
instruction.”21  If a public secondary school allows even one “noncurricu-
lum related student group” to meet on campus during this time, the EAA is 
                                                          
14.  Id. at 19226. 
15. 130 CONG. REC. 23, 32315 (1984) (“These guidelines should prove to be of great 
value to school administrators, teachers, and students in interpreting and implementing the 
Equal Access Act.”) (statement of Rep. Don Bonker (D, Washington)). 
16.  Id. at 32318. 
17.  Id. at 32315 (“The guidelines are especially important because there is no congres-
sional report for the final version of the legislation, which was added as an amendment to 
the Emergency Math/Science Education Act.”) (statement of Rep. Don Bonker (D, Wash-
ington)). 
18.  Id. at 32317. 
19.  20 U.S.C. § 4071(b). 
20.  Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 239 (1990). 
21.  20 U.S.C. § 4072(4). 
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triggered and the school may not deny other clubs equal access to school 
premises during this time based on the content of their speech.22 
Two subsections of the EAA have proved especially contentious.  Sub-
section (c) provides that “schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportu-
nity to students who wish to conduct a meeting within its limited open fo-
rum” if the school ensures that the meetings are voluntary and student-
initiated; are not sponsored by the school, the government, or its agents or 
employees; do not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly 
conduct of educational activities within the school; and are not directed, 
controlled, conducted, or regularly attended by “nonschool persons.”23  
Subsection (f) states that the EAA does not purport to “limit the authority 
of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on 
school premises, to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to 
assure that attendance of students at the meetings is voluntary.”24  To-
gether, subsections (c) and (f) have given rise to three situations in which a 
school district may justifiably exclude a student group, despite application 
of the EAA.  Courts have categorized these three situations as: (1) main-
taining order and discipline; (2) protecting well-being of students and fac-
ulty; and (3) material and substantial interference with the orderly conduct 
of educational activities. 
Much of the EAA’s language derives from two Supreme Court cases 
significant to the legal evolution of First Amendment rights in an educa-
tional context.25  In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, Justice Abe For-
tas famously stated, “[i]t can hardly be argued that either students or teach-
ers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”26  The Court went on to hold that school authorities 
could not lawfully prohibit students from wearing black armbands in pro-
test of the Vietnam War because the students’ expression was akin to “pure 
speech” protected under the First Amendment and posed no threat of dis-
turbance to “the work of the schools or the rights of other students.”27   
As a counterpoint to Tinker, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier established the 
rule that school officials may exercise editorial control over the content of 
students’ curriculum-related, or “school sponsored,” speech without violat-
ing the First Amendment.28  Hazelwood, therefore, is often cited in the ef-
forts of school administrators to exert control over political debate on cam-
                                                          
22.  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240. 
23.  20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(1), (2), (4), (5). 
24.  20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). 
25.  See, e.g., Kelly A. Sherrill, The Equal Access Act and Gay/Straight Clubs, INQUIRY 
AND ANALYSIS, May 2003, at 2 (discussing the source of EAA’s distinction between “cur-
riculum” and “noncurriculum related” speech); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240-41 (citing Tinker 
and Hazelwood to explain legislative intent behind the EAA). 
26.  393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
27.  Id. at 508. 
28.  484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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pus.  Meanwhile, Tinker sets the standard for students’ right to free speech 
and expression to the extent that such activities do not cause material and 
substantial interference with school operations. 
The statutory language of the EAA was taken directly from Tinker 
when it established that noncurricular meetings may be disallowed to the 
extent that they “materially and substantially interfere with the orderly 
conduct of educational activities within the school.”29  It is clear from 
Tinker that, in order to justify an abrogation of student expression by au-
thorities, the material and substantial interference must come from the ex-
pression itself — in other words, disruptive objection from external actors 
in response to controversial student expression is not sufficient to justify 
school censorship.30  The protesting students “caused discussion outside of 
the classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder. . . .  [Under 
such circumstances,] our Constitution does not permit officials of the State 
to deny their form of expression.”31  Tinker emphasized further that censor-
ship must not be based on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance:” 
 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to 
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere de-
sire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accom-
pany an unpopular viewpoint.  Certainly where there is no finding 
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would “ma-
terially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appro-
priate discipline in the operation of the school,” the prohibition 
cannot be sustained.32 
 
Evidence that Tinker formed the background to the EAA is abundant in 
the legislative history,33 and the logic of the case has played a prominent 
role in many judicial interpretations of the EAA’s requirements.34 
                                                          
29.  See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 241; Boyd, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 689; Hsu v. Roslyn Union 
Free Sch. Dist. No. 3, 85 F.3d 839, 868 n.28 (2d Cir. 1996). 
30.  393 U.S. 503, 508. 
31.  Id. at 515. 
32.  Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749). 
33.  See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 14, 19217 (1984) (“There was a very famous case of a 
girl who was the daughter of a Quaker minister who, during the Vietnam war, wore an arm-
band to school to protest our Vietnam war policy.  It was interpreted by school officials as a 
political statement and as such was not allowed in the classroom. . . .  The court ruled that 
school administrators had no legal constitutional right to short-circuit a student’s political 
rights.”) (statement of Sen. Mark Hatfield (R, Oregon)); 130 CONG. REC. 23, 32317 (1984) 
(stating in the Guidelines that schools “must not allow a ‘heckler’s veto.’”). 
34.  See, e.g., Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 
2000) (discussing facts of Tinker and concluding that “material disruption” standard from 
Tinker is “very similar to the one adopted by Congress in the Equal Access Act.”). 
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C. THE EAA AND RELIGIOUS STUDENT GROUPS 
The EAA survived its first legal challenge in Board of Education v. 
Mergens.35  Applying the three-part Lemon test, the Supreme Court held 
that the Establishment Clause was not violated because the EAA (1) was 
secular in nature in that its primary purpose was preventing discrimination 
against “religious and other types of speech;” (2) did not have the primary 
effect of advancing religion; and (3) did not foster an excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion since the EAA ensured that meet-
ings must be student initiated.36  Moreover, students would not receive the 
impression that school officials were endorsing religion because member-
ship in the extracurricular clubs was voluntary.37  In deference to Congress, 
the Court departed from precedent and held that high school students were 
no less likely than college students to distinguish “[s]tate-initiated, school 
sponsored, or teacher-led religious speech on the one hand and student-
initiated, student-led religious speech on the other.”38 
In subsequent EAA cases, lower courts upheld the right of student-
initiated religious clubs to meet on high school campuses.39  Disputes often 
turned on whether the statute applied, based on the meaning of “limited 
open forum” or “noncurriculum related.”40  Application of the EAA to en-
hance religious freedom was consistent with the most specific objective of 
Congress in enacting the statute.41  However, courts recognized early on the 
potential significance of the EAA to other student groups.  As Justice Ken-
nedy observed, “one of the consequences of the statute, as we now interpret 
it, is that clubs of a most controversial character might have access to the 
student life of high schools that in the past have given official recognition 
only to clubs of a more conventional kind.”42 
                                                          
35.  496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
36.  Id. at 249-53 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)). 
37.  Id. at 252. 
38.  Id. at 250-51. 
39.  Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002); Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees, 106 
F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 1997). 
40.  See, e.g., Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244 (3d Cir. 1993) (inter-
preting “curriculum related” narrowly, to mean only the most obvious groups such as the 
math team). 
41.  130 CONG. REC. 14, 19216 (1984) (“The amendment will, for the first time, make 
it clear that secondary school students engaging in religious speech have the same rights to 
associate together and to speak as do students who wish to meet to discuss chess, politics, or 
philosophy.”) (statement of Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R, Alabama); see also Colin v. Orange 
Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing legislative intent be-
hind the EAA “to counteract perceived discrimination against religious speech in public 
schools”). 
42.  Mergens, 496 U.S. at 259. 
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D.  THE EAA AND LGBT STUDENT GROUPS 
1.  East High School GSA v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City 
The EAA was first invoked by LGBT high school students in 1999 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah.43  In East High School, plaintiffs survived a summary 
judgment motion when they alleged that defendants’ refusal to allow “gay-
positive viewpoints” on campus constituted a violation of the First 
Amendment and the EAA.44  Plaintiffs were subsequently awarded injunc-
tive relief, which required the school to recognize the club based on a con-
sistent application of coherent policies developed by the school itself, the 
GSA having established that prior to that point the school had “either mis-
applied the . . . standards or impermissibly added an additional standard” 
when reviewing its application.45  Ultimately, the Salt Lake City contro-
versy was resolved when the school district, faced with protracted litigation 
and negative nationwide publicity, voted to settle and allow the GSA to 
meet on campus.46  Legal strategists for Lambda saw this as a sign of good 
things to come.  As Senior Staff Attorney David S. Buckel stated, “The les-
son from Salt Lake City is in big block letters on the chalk board: do not 
harm your students to block a gay-supportive club and do not spend hun-
dreds of thousands in education dollars defending that harm.  Do the right 
thing from the beginning.”47 
2. Colin v. Orange Unified School District 
The first decision on the merits of an EAA claim by a GSA came not 
long after East High School, in a district court in Orange County, Califor-
nia, in 2000.48  In Colin, the school district denied access to a GSA, arguing 
that the club was related to the curriculum of health and sex education 
classes and therefore fell into a category of student expression unprotected 
by the EAA.49  After finding that the GSA was a noncurriculum related 
student group within the meaning of the EAA,50 the court held that the 
                                                          
43.  E. High GSA v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 
(C.D. Utah 1999). 
44.  Id. at 1195. 
45.  E. High Sch. Prism Club v. Seidel, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (D. Utah 2000). 
46.  Press Release, Lambda Legal, Students and Salt Lake City School Board End Feud 
Over Gay-Supportive Clubs (Oct. 6, 2000), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/ 
cgi-bin/iowa/news/press.html?record=721.  See also Regina Grattan, It’s Not Just for Relig-
ion Anymore: Expanding the Protections of the Equal Access Act to Gay, Lesbian, and Bi-
sexual High School Students, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 589-591 (1999) (discussing reac-
tion to the case in Utah, including enactment of legislation “specifically designed to prevent 
gay student clubs from meeting on public school grounds and to discourage teachers from 
sponsoring such clubs”). 
47.  Press Release, Lambda Legal, supra note 46, at 2. 
48.  Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
49.  Id. at 1143. 
50.  Id. at 1144 (noting that plaintiffs “laughed on the stand at the thought of the group 
discussing the ‘physiology of the reproductive system’ and the other issues covered in 
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school’s refusal to recognize the GSA as an official student group consti-
tuted “discrimination against the Plaintiffs on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion or perceived sexual orientation.”51  Recognizing the novelty of apply-
ing the EAA in this context, the court observed: 
 
If this Court were to allow the School Board to deny recogni-
tion to the Gay-Straight Alliance, it would be guilty of the current 
evil of ‘judicial activism,’ carving out an exception from the bench 
to the statute enacted by the politically accountable Congress.  If 
this Court were to interpret the Equal Access Act differently than 
courts have in the past when applying the Act to Christian groups, 
it would be complicit in the discrimination against students who 
want to raise awareness about homophobia and discuss how to deal 
with harassment directed towards gay youth.52 
 
Because the Orange County School District in Colin did not rely on 
any of the EAA’s justifications for exclusion, there was no need for the 
court to reach the issue of what would constitute a “material and substantial 
disruption.”  However, the district court implicitly assumed that the Tinker 
standard would apply to the EAA in its discussion of the First Amendment 
background to the case, in which Tinker is cited six times.53  The court also 
drew an explicit comparison between Tinker and the case at bar, conclud-
ing that: 
 
The Board Members may be uncomfortable about students dis-
cussing sexual orientation and how all students need to accept each 
other, whether gay or straight.  As in Tinker, however, when the 
school administration was uncomfortable with students wearing 
symbols of protest against the Vietnam War, Defendants can not 
censor the students’ speech to avoid discussions on campus that 
cause them discomfort or represent an unpopular viewpoint.54 
 
3. Boyd County GSA v. Board of Education of Boyd County, Kentucky 
In Boyd, a Kentucky school board held an emergency meeting and de-
                                                                                                                                      
Health class,” and concluding that the GSA’s true objective was better characterized as “to 
talk about the experiences that gay, lesbian and bisexual kids go through in their everyday 
lives such as harassment, coming out of the closet or telling people that they are gay: the 
fear and the emotions such as self-hatred or denial that a lot of kids go through and the har-
assment they get and how to deal with that.”). 
51.  Id. at 1149. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. at 1141 (discussing facts of Tinker and concluding that “material disruption” 
standard from Tinker is “very similar to the one adopted by Congress in the Equal Access 
Act.”). 
54.  Id. at 1149. 
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cided to suspend all clubs, both curricular and extracurricular, in reaction to 
an on-campus protest following the formation of a GSA on campus.55  The 
court found, however, that a limited public forum existed because certain 
clubs continued to hold meetings on campus.56  Having found that the EAA 
applied, the court went on to consider the school’s arguments under subsec-
tions (c) and (f).  It concluded that allowing the GSA to meet on campus 
would not materially or substantially interfere with the orderly conduct of 
educational activities within the school; limit the school’s ability to main-
tain order and discipline on campus; or limit the school’s ability to protect 
the well-being of its students and faculty.57  Notably, the Boyd court inter-
preted “material and substantial interference” as importing the standard 
from Tinker.58 
Crucial to the court’s reasoning, therefore, was the fact that the Ken-
tucky school district’s denial of access was a direct result of a protest on 
campus and telephoned complaints from opponents of the GSA among the 
community.59  Upholding the school’s refusal of access on this basis would 
be the equivalent of allowing a “heckler’s veto,” which the Boyd court held 
would violate the spirit of the EAA.  “Defendants are not permitted to re-
strict plaintiff’s speech and association as a means of preventing disruptive 
responses to it.”60  Looking at Tinker, the proper analysis of the “maintain-
ing order and discipline” exception was to determine whether “engaging in 
the forbidden conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline”61 — in other words, whether there 
had been substantial disruptions caused by GSA members themselves.  
Finding “no documented instances” of such disruptions, the court ordered 
the school district to reinstate the GSA. 
III. CAUDILLO, ET AL. V. LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In Lubbock, Texas, a branch of the GSA was initiated by LGBT high 
school students who felt that they would benefit from having a safe place to 
discuss issues of identity and sexuality with other straight and LGBT 
                                                          
55.  258 F. Supp. 2d 667, 675 (E.D. Ky. 2003). 
56.  Id. at 687-88. 
57.  Id. at 688. 
58.  “Incorporation of the Tinker rule into 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f) means that a school may 
not deny equal access to a student group because student and community opposition to the 
group substantially interferes with the school’s ability to maintain order and discipline, even 
though equal access is not required if the student group itself substantially interferes with 
the school’s ability to maintain order and discipline.”  Id. at 690. 
59.  Id. at 688. 
60.  Id. at 690 (citing Tinker). 
61.  Id. at 689 (citing Tinker). 
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teens.62  One of the group’s founders, high school senior Ricky Waite, 
stated, “Being gay in Lubbock, Texas, is not like being gay anywhere else.  
Growing up, I heard that gays were child molesters, drug addicts, sex 
fiends. . . .  Then I learned not everyone was like that.”63  Lubbock 
Gay/Straight Alliance (LGSA) member Rene Caudillo said the LGSA’s 
“main purpose was to help people” and to give fellow students “somebody 
to talk to so they wouldn’t feel like we did.”64  On November 6, 2002, 
Waite, Caudillo, and other members of LGSA requested permission from 
the Lubbock Independent School District (LISD) to pass out club fliers, use 
the PA system to advertise meetings, and be recognized as an official 
school club with the right to meet on campus after classes.65  As required 
by LISD regulations, members of LGSA filed a written request with the 
school principal, which contained a list of the group’s purposes and goals.66  
The group’s goals were to: 
 
(1)  Provide guidance to youth who come to us to the best of 
our ability when we cannot provide help[,] relay them to those who 
can. 
(2)  Educate those willing about non-heterosexuals. 
(3)  Improve the relationship between heterosexuals and homo-
sexuals. 
(4)  Help the community. 
(5)  Increase rights given to non-heterosexuals. 
(6)  Educate willing youth about safe sex, AIDS, hatred, etc. 
(7) Enhance the relationship between youth and their fami-
lies.67 
 
LISD policy provided that such requests “may be approved by the 
principal and the Superintendent . . . without regard to the religious, politi-
cal, philosophical or other content of the speech likely to be associated with 
the group’s meetings.”68  LISD also maintained a policy that “the District 
shall not prohibit student expression solely because other students, teach-
ers, administrators, or parents may disagree with its content.”69  In consid-
ering the LGSA’s request, school authorities reviewed a website that the 
students proposed to advertise on their fliers.70  The LGSA website, created 
                                                          
62. Ray Glass, Students Speak Out in Push for Gay Straight Alliance, LUBBOCK 
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, October 29, 2003, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
66.  Complaint at 5, Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d 550 (No. 5:03-CV-165-C). 
67.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 556. 
68.  Complaint, supra note 66, at 5 (citing L.I.S.D. LDU 44-02 11/04/2002). 
69.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 557. 
70.  Id. 
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by member Rene Caudillo, contained links to two websites containing 
sexually explicit material (www.gay.com and www.youthresource.com).71  
After review of the websites, the principal of LHS and assistant superinten-
dent of LISD refused to recognize the LGSA and denied its request to post 
fliers and use the PA system.72  Superintendent Hardin claimed denial of 
access was based on LISD’s abstinence-only policy and on “the well-being 
and disruption exceptions” to the EAA.73  The LGSA, represented by 
Lambda Legal, then filed suit in federal court claiming that the district had 
denied them access to school facilities based on the content of their speech, 
in violation of the EAA and the First Amendment.74 
In its response to the suit, LISD argued that refusing access to the 
LGSA was based on the school district’s duty of “maintaining the well-
being of the student,” and “precluding groups on its campuses which advo-
cate a violation of law which overrides a student’s First Amendment right 
to free speech.”75  At the time of the LGSA’s request, homosexual acts 
were against the law in Texas.76  Caudillo filed suit against LISD just days 
after Lawrence v. Texas, in which the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the “Homosexual Conduct” section of the Texas Penal Code was un-
constitutional.77  Nonetheless, in its defense LISD cited the crime of inde-
cency with a child,78 a statute in a different section of the Texas Penal Code 
prohibiting homosexual acts between minors.79  Claiming the LGSA would 
promote unlawful activity, LISD argued its exclusion was justified by sub-
                                                          
71.  Id. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Complaint, supra note 66, at 6. 
75.  Elizabeth Langton, LISD Cites Criminalization of Child Sex as Suit Defense, 
LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, July 31, 2003, available at http://www.lgrl.org/news/ 
article.php?newsID=26. 
76.  TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.06 (Vernon 2003); Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
77.  539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
78.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
79.  TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a) (Vernon 2003).  It is worth noting that the language 
of the statute is aimed at sexual molestation, not consensual sex: 
(a) A person commits an offense if, with a child younger than 17 years and not the per-
son’s spouse, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex, the person: 
(1) engages in sexual contact with the child or causes the child to engage in sexual con-
tact; or 
(2) with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person: 
(A) exposes the person’s anus or any part of the person’s genitals, knowing the child is 
present; or 
(B) causes the child to expose the child’s anus or any part of the child’s genitals. 
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor: 
(1) was not more than three years older than the victim and of the opposite sex; 
(2) did not use duress, force, or a threat against the victim at the time of the offense; 
and (3) at the time of the offense: 
(A) was not required under Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, to register for life 
as a sex offender; or 
(B) was not a person who under Chapter 62 had a reportable conviction or adjudication 
for an offense under this section. 
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section (d)(5) of the EAA, providing that the statute not be construed to au-
thorize “meetings that are otherwise unlawful.”80  Superintendent Jack 
Clemmons claimed in an affidavit, “I would have denied other clubs whose 
basis was sex.  I would have denied a Bestiality Club.  I would have denied 
a Gigolo Club.  I would have denied a Prostitute Club.  Likewise, I would 
deny any club that has as its basis an illegal act, such as the Marijuana 
Club, Kids for Cocaine, the Drinking Club, etc.”81 
An additional basis for LISD’s refusal of access was the fact that mem-
bers of the Lubbock community had called the Central Office to express 
concern for the safety of LGSA members.82  Arguing that the “potential for 
sexual-orientation harassment existed on LISD campuses that could lead to 
disruptive and dangerous conditions for the students,” LISD claimed it was 
within its rights to invoke the “maintaining order-and-discipline exceptions 
to the EAA,”83 emphasizing that under federal law, school districts have the 
obligation to prevent sexual-orientation harassment of its students.84  Plain-
tiffs argued that LISD’s denial in the face of community objection to the 
LGSA amounted to allowing an unconstitutional “heckler’s veto.”85 
Based on Lambda Legal’s recent triumph in Lawrence and its success-
ful litigation campaign with the EAA,86 the plaintiffs fully expected the 
court to order LISD to allow them to use school facilities.  Lawyer Brian 
Chase told an interviewer for the Texas Triangle, “I don’t want to say any-
thing for sure, but hopes are high.”87 
B. THE OPINION 
The district court awarded summary judgment to defendants, ruling 
that LISD had not violated the students’ First Amendment rights and had 
“properly invoked exclusions and exceptions” under the EAA.88  This case 
                                                          
80.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
81.  Brent Brumley, Superintendent Who Blocked Gay Group Was Having Affair on 
School Property, TEX. TRIANGLE, Aug. 22, 2003, available at http://www.lgrl.org/news/ 
article.php?newsID=400 (discussing CBS affiliate’s report that Clemmons, who was named 
as a defendant but dropped from the suit after “suddenly and unexpectedly retiring,” had 
“engaged in a nearly one-year affair with one of his employees on school property and dur-
ing school time,” including offering his employee money in exchange for sexual favors in 
his office just hours before defending LISD’s abstinence-only policy on TV). 
82.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
83.  Id. at 569-70. 
84.  Id. at 568 (citing TITLE IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). 
85.  Id. 
86.  Lambda Legal represented plaintiffs in E. High School, Boyd, and Colin.  In Texas, 
only months before filing suit against LISD, the organization settled a suit with a school dis-
trict in Houston which agreed to allow a GSA onto campus.  Press Release, Lesbian/Gay 
Rights Lobby, Lubbock Town Hall Meeting on the Gay Student Experience and Gay-
Straight Alliance (October 22, 2003). 
87.  Steven Morris, Hopes Are High for Lubbock High School Gay/Straight Alliance, 
TEX. TRIANGLE, Oct. 31, 2003, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/ 
courtingjustice/index.html?page=justice_speakingOut. 
88.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 572. 
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had “nothing to do with a denial of rights to students because of their sex-
ual viewpoints,” District Judge Sam Cummings wrote in a 23-page opinion; 
LISD’s actions were rather “an assertion of a school’s right not to surrender 
control of the public school system to students and erode a community’s 
standard of what subject matter is considered obscene and inappropriate.”89  
It was the first loss for Lambda Legal in a GSA lawsuit.90 
Two aspects of Caudillo are particularly troubling to advocates of 
equal access for LGBT high school students.  First, with regard to the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment argument, the court held that denial of access 
was a narrowly drawn restriction in light of LISD’s compelling interest in 
protecting children from the sexually explicit material found on the 
LGSA’s website.  Second, the court held that the Tinker standard did not 
apply to the “maintaining order and discipline” and “protecting well-being” 
provisions in the EAA, thus allowing LISD to deny access on the basis of 
speculation and complaints from the community in violation of the First 
Amendment as well as LISD’s stated policy. 
The district court in Caudillo held that LISD had not violated the First 
Amendment because its restriction was “narrowly drawn in light of the 
compelling interest” of protecting children from the sexually explicit mate-
rial found on the LGSA’s website.91  An important case for LISD in argu-
ing this issue was Bethel v. Fraser, in which the Supreme Court held that 
the First Amendment was not violated when a high school student in Wash-
ington was disciplined for his “offensively lewd and indecent” nominating 
speech at a student assembly.92  It was “perfectly appropriate” in that case 
“for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that 
vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the ‘fundamen-
tal values’ of public school education.”93  Therefore, held the court in Cau-
dillo, LISD had lawfully denied the LGSA any access to school facilities 
because of the possibility that students might be exposed to sexually ex-
plicit material contained on one of the websites linked to the LGSA website 
advertised on the group’s fliers.94 
The situation in Lubbock was a stark contrast to Bethel.  Unlike in Be-
thel, the prohibited speech of the LGSA was noncurricular and related to an 
event not sponsored by the school, therefore it was entitled to the protection 
of Tinker.  The nominating speech in Bethel, on the other hand, was a com-
ponent of a school-sponsored event and was therefore subject to the 
school’s editorial authority under Hazelwood.  In Bethel, there was a real 
danger of the students who were offended by the speech believing that it 
                                                          
89.   Id. 
90.  Ray Glass, Students Not to Appeal Gay Straight Alliance Ruling, LUBBOCK 
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, Apr. 6, 2004, available at http://www.lambdalegal.org. 
91.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 563. 
92.  478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986). 
93.  Id. at 685-86 (quoting from Justice Black’s dissent in Tinker). 
94.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 561. 
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was an approved message by the school itself; whereas here, given LISD’s 
conservative stance on sexuality, there was little likelihood of any students 
confusing the LGSA’s fliers with official school policy.  But even assum-
ing that the material on the websites was legitimately objectionable,95 EAA 
case law and Guidelines indicate that the school district was within its 
rights to restrict the websites advertised on LGSA’s fliers without denying 
access to the group altogether.96  Since LISD maintained an abstinence-
only policy and curriculum, it would have been a reasonable, nondiscrimi-
natory restriction for the authorities to require LGSA to edit its website in 
order to obtain official recognition and use of school facilities.  Under the 
First Amendment, this would have been truly the least restrictive policy for 
the school district to pursue. 
The facts in Bethel also provide a compelling illustration of the type of 
expression that materially and substantially interferes with educational ac-
tivities.  For example, a school counselor who was present at the assembly 
observed the following reactions to the speech: 
 
[S]ome students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphi-
cally simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respon-
dent’s speech.  Other students appeared to be bewildered and em-
barrassed by the speech.  One teacher reported that on the day 
following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of 
the scheduled class lesson in order to discuss the speech with the 
class.97 
A fair reading of the LGSA’s stated goals is that the group intended 
primarily to discuss sexual identity and political activism rather than actual 
sexual conduct.  This type of expression is more closely related to what the 
Bethel Court referred to as the “nondisruptive, passive expression of a po-
litical viewpoint in Tinker.”98  The Caudillo court’s reasoning that the 
LGSA’s very existence created “a material and substantial interference 
with LISD’s educational mission and function” relies on a new standard of 
interference unsupported by precedent or legislative intent.99  In effect, this 
                                                          
95.  Plaintiff Rene Caudillo admitted in his deposition that the content accessible on 
www.gay.com was inappropriate for a high school campus (including topics such as “New 
Sexy Gay Game Pics”).  However, he further testified “that the www.gay.com content was 
removed from the [LGSA] website some time after requesting to post the fliers and use the 
P.A. system.”  The www.youthresource.com website remained accessible at the time when 
LISD Superintendent Hardin made his final decision to reject the request.  Topics on this 
website were primarily health-related, including articles on safe sex, anal warts, and erection 
problems.  (Id. at 557-58). 
96.  See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 23, 32317 (1984) (discussing the school’s retention of 
authority to establish reasonable, uniform, nondiscriminatory regulations for student meet-
ings under the EAA). 
97.  478 U.S. at 678. 
98.  Id. at 680. 
99.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 568. 
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is precisely the “judicial activism” feared by the district court in Colin 
when it wrote that to treat groups of LGBT students differently from reli-
gious groups would mean to “be complicit in the discrimination against 
students who want to raise awareness about homophobia and discuss how 
to deal with harassment directed towards gay youth.”100 
One of the most alarming aspects of Caudillo is its holding that the 
Tinker standard did not apply to the “maintaining order and discipline” and 
“protecting well-being” provisions in the EAA.  Noting, “[t]he Court is 
aware that courts in other circuits have adopted the view that the EAA in-
corporated the Tinker rule that the disruption must ‘materially and substan-
tially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the opera-
tion of the school,’” the opinion went on to state that although subsection 
(c) of the statute “somewhat tracks the Tinker language, this Court does not 
believe that the EAA requires such a substantial showing of interference 
under other exceptions.”101  Since subsection (f) lacks the phrase “materi-
ally and substantially,” the court reasoned, a lower standard sufficed in or-
der for LISD to show that it had lawfully denied access to LSGA in the in-
terests of “maintaining order and discipline” and protecting “the well-being 
of students and faculty.”102 
Thinking of these provisions as “exceptions” is troubling because it 
implies that a school is entitled to engage in viewpoint discrimination if 
certain factors are met.  A better reading of subsections (c) and (f) is that 
they are intended to clarify the EAA’s requirements and to ensure that if a 
school district excludes a group because it interferes with order and disci-
pline or threatens the well-being of students and faculty, etc., then such ac-
tion is outside the realm of conduct prohibited by the EAA.  Subsection (c) 
is titled “fair opportunity criteria,” and the bulk of its language is aimed at 
ensuring that the meetings are truly student initiated.103  Subsection (f), en-
titled “Authority of schools with respect to order, discipline, well-being, 
and attendance concerns,” is more convincingly a limitation on the re-
                                                          
100.  Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1149. 
101.  Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 569. 
102.  Id. 
103.  The subsection of the statute reads: 
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a 
meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides that – 
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; 
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or its agents 
or employees; 
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious meetings 
only in a nonparticipatory capacity; 
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly conduct 
of educational activities within the school; and 
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activities of 
student groups.   
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c). 
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quirements of the EAA.104  But again, the statutory provisions merely rein-
force the school district’s authority as it has traditionally been understood.  
Nothing about the subsection should imply legislative intent to grant an ex-
emption. 
Even if they are exceptions, legislative history indicates that the First 
Amendment as interpreted in Tinker and Hazelwood forms the background 
against which the EAA was enacted — thus the statute incorporates the 
value of not allowing a “heckler’s veto” to influence students’ right of free 
expression.  According to the Guidelines: 
 
The rights of the lawful, orderly student group to meet are not 
dependent upon the fact that other students may object to the ideas 
expressed.  All students enjoy free speech constitutional guaran-
tees.  It is the school’s responsibility to maintain discipline in order 
that all student groups be afforded an equal opportunity to meet 
peacefully without harassment.  The school must not allow a 
“heckler’s veto.”105 
 
For the court in Caudillo to interpret “exceptions” to the EAA in a 
manner that evades the protection of speech guaranteed in Tinker is to re-
draw the parameters of First Amendment rights of high school students as 
they have been understood since 1969.106 
If the court had applied the EAA using the standard laid out in Tinker 
and the Guidelines, then the proper focus of its analysis would have been 
the expression of the LGSA itself — not other students’ or community 
members’ objections to the LGSA and not those portions of the LGSA’s 
expression which could easily be censored by a reasonable, nondiscrimina-
tory restriction consistent with LISD policy.  Using this standard, the court 
would have reached the conclusion that the LGSA was entitled to be rec-
ognized and to have access to school facilities under the EAA.  The fact 
                                                          
104.  “Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the school, 
its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to protect the 
well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at meetings is 
voluntary.”  20 U.S.C. § 4071(f). 
105.  130 CONG. REC. 23, 32317 (1984). 
106.  The court recognized this problem in the following passage: 
It is true that to suppress expression on the basis of the angry reaction that it may gen-
erate is precisely what the “heckler’s veto” cases [Tinker, etc.] forbid[.] . . . But the “order 
and discipline” defense that we just quoted suggests that the principle of those cases has not 
been carried over into the Equal Access Act. 
(Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (quoting Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 
274 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 2001))). 
As I discuss, there is no basis for this argument.  In fact, reference to Tinker and 
Hazelwood at multiple times during congressional debate on the bill, as well as the fact that 
the EAA was  specifically intended to overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Widmar, 
suggests that if Congress had intended to overturn other Supreme Court cases as well, it 
would have made this intention explicit. 
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that the court reached the opposite conclusion is dependent on applying a 
lower standard that, by implication, grants an unconstitutional preference to 
religious groups. 
For example, among the groups officially recognized by LISD and 
permitted to hold meetings at LHS was the Fellowship of Christian Ath-
letes (“FCA”).107  The FCA is an organization formed expressly to discuss 
religious belief and promote Christianity.108  Therefore, the FCA “inter-
feres” with the curriculum at LHS in the sense that the school cannot teach 
religious belief or promote a particular religion.  If it does not substantially 
interfere with order and discipline to discuss religion on campus at a public 
high school, then merely discussing sex on campus likewise does not inter-
fere with the school’s abstinence-only policy — especially since schools 
are constitutionally required to uphold separation of church and state, 
whereas there is no basis in law for an educational policy that prohibits 
sexual content.109  By applying a lower standard to the LGSA than it would 
to a religious club, Caudillo read into the EAA an unconstitutional ad-
vancement of religion.  Ironically, if the Supreme Court in Mergens had in-
terpreted the EAA in the same way, then it would have struck down the 
legislation as violative of the Establishment Clause, and neither religious 
nor LGBT teens would have the protected right of equal access to meet at 
school. 
Likewise, the court applied a lower standard under the “protecting 
well-being of students and faculty” provision in the EAA.  The result of the 
court’s decision not to follow Tinker was that LISD could censor student 
expression in the interests of protecting students from unlawful conduct ab-
sent any evidence that such unlawful conduct would actually take place.  
The court’s failure to require LISD to back up its allegations was nothing 
short of condoning a pretext for unconstitutional discrimination on the ba-
sis of viewpoint.  After Lawrence, it is doubtful whether § 21.11 would be 
upheld with regard to consensual sex between minors.110  However, even if 
                                                          
107.  Complaint, supra note 66, at 5. 
108.  The FCA website describes the organization’s mission as “to present to athletes 
and coaches and all whom they influence the challenge and adventure of receiving Jesus 
Christ as Savior and Lord, serving Him in their relationships and in the fellowship of the 
church.”  Fellowship of Christian Athletes, http://www.fca.org/aboutfca (last visited April 
11, 2006). 
109.  See Grattan, supra note 12, at 594 (arguing that “it would be easier to apply the 
Equal Access Act to gay student clubs rather than religious clubs because the constitutional 
barrier that exists with religion, the Establishment Clause, does not have a counterpart in the 
homosexual context.  If the Supreme Court is willing to allow religious clubs to use school 
grounds to conduct meetings, even in light of the Establishment Clause, the Equal Access 
Act ought to apply to gay student clubs with which no such contrary constitutional mandate 
exists.”). 
110.  The court noted the questionable status of § 21.11 but determined that it was a 
sufficient basis for LISD’s action because, although a similar statute in Kansas had been 
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court after Lawrence, the Kansas Court of Appeals held that 
the statute was constitutional. (Caudillo, 311 F. Supp. 3d at 566, n.9). 
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the laws in Texas prohibited any kind of homosexual contact between mi-
nors, the Caudillo court was wrong to deny equal access based on specula-
tive misconduct.  According to the legislative guidelines for the EAA, 
groups wishing to discuss “alternative lifestyles” should not be barred on 
the content of their speech, even where such speech includes advocating or 
discussing “changes in existing law,” as long as the school does not sanc-
tion “meetings in which unlawful conduct occurs.”111  As one observer of 
Caudillo noted, LISD’s argument that the purpose of LGSA meetings was 
to violate state law made “about as much sense as banning the Junior Prom 
Committee in an effort to protect the participants from sexual activity.”112 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The history of the EAA depicts a fascinating give-and-take relationship 
between legislatures, courts, and the Constitution in determining rights.  
Cases under the EAA illustrate the interplay between the two guarantees of 
the First Amendment: the protection of free speech and the preservation of 
separation between church and state.  Yet if the EAA is to continue to have 
any meaning consistent with the First Amendment, plaintiffs must empha-
size that the statute was not intended to do away with years of First 
Amendment case law prohibiting the influence of a “heckler’s veto.”  Since 
Tinker, this prohibition has served to protect the most politically sensitive 
occasions of student expression.  It is vitally important that LGBT students, 
who are so often the victims of harassment and even brutality by such 
“hecklers,” not be stripped of this protection.  Courts should not apply an 
implicit reading of the EAA that prefers religious speech to other types of 
expression.  Although it was an unfortunate outcome for the students of 
LHS, perhaps Caudillo will serve as an example for more successful litiga-
tion in the future. 
V.  EPILOGUE: LUBBOCK AFTER CAUDILLO 
Attorneys representing the LGSA reported to the local newspaper that 
the decision not to appeal the court’s unfavorable decision “had a lot to do 
with the kids” involved in the case, four of whom had either graduated 
from LHS or would graduate in a few months.113  A week after the ruling, 
lawyers for LISD were already hearing from “many school districts around 
                                                          
111.  130 CONG. REC. 23, 32317 (1984); see also Grattan, supra note 12, at 596-97 (ar-
guing that the “maintaining order and discipline” defense as used by school districts in states 
that criminalize homosexual acts fails to meet the exception to the First Amendment’s pro-
tection of advocacy of illegal conduct as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969)). 
112.  Ann Rostow, Lawyers Argue that Gay Club Encourages Illegal Sex, TEX. 
TRIANGLE, Aug. 8, 2003, available at http://www.lgrl.org/news/article.php?newsID=315. 
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the country” about their landmark victory.114  School district attorney Ann 
Manning stated, “This is the first and only victory [in a Gay Straight Alli-
ance case] for a school district in the United States.  It could be a pattern by 
which school districts could maintain keeping clubs based on sex and sex-
ual activity out of the purview of the Equal Access Act.”115 
Lambda Legal has continued to be active in the Lubbock community, 
and students may attempt to reform the LGSA.  Attorney Brian Chase 
stated that although the court ruled against them, “we do know that we did 
win in the court of public opinion.  There were a great many citizens of 
Lubbock who support the effort to form the alliance now.”116  On June 25, 
2004, Lambda Legal announced the selection of the LGSA for the Courage 
Award, which the organization presents annually “to an individual or or-
ganization in recognition of outstanding courage in the face of uncertainty, 
discrimination and hostility in the advancement of civil rights for the 
LGBT and HIV/AIDS communities.”117 
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